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WHAT IS THE “INVENTION”?
CHRISTOPHER A. COTROPIA*
ABSTRACT
Patent law is in flux, with recent disputes and changes in doctrine
fueled by increased attention from the Supreme Court and en banc
activity by the Federal Circuit. The natural reaction is to analyze
each doctrinal area involved on its own. Upon a closer look, however,
many patent cases concern a single, fundamental dispute. Conflicts
in opinions on such issues as claim interpretation methodology and
the written description requirement are really disagreements over
which “invention” the courts should be considering.
There are two concepts of invention currently in play in patent
decisions. The first is an “external invention” definition, in which
courts define the invention by the detailed technology discussion in
the patent specification’s descriptions and drawings. Other decisions
invoke a “claim-centered invention” definition, which relies almost
exclusively on the claim, a single sentence at the end of the patent.
Judging these two definitions against common patent theories can
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help to determine which best fits the theories’ narratives. This Article
concludes that the external invention is more favorable because it
grounds exclusivity in what the inventor has actually done or plans
to do and, accordingly, is more likely to comport with common patent
theories. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent law has changed dramatically over the past ten years. The
Supreme Court is now more active than it once was in reviewing
patent cases.1 The Federal Circuit goes en banc more frequently in
attempts to resolve disconnects in doctrine or simply to clarify
them.2 These disputes and changes impact all aspects of patent law.
Each is interesting in its own right and prompts much discussion
among patent scholars.3 The presence of so many conflicts and
changes in patent doctrine raises the question of whether these
disputes share a common theme. Is there an underlying fundamen-
tal disagreement in patent law?
This Article contends that there is. The discourse in various
doctrinal areas revolves around a single question—what is the
“invention”?4 The concept of invention sits at the center of patent
1. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (discussing the patentable subject
matter requirement); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (reversing the
Federal Circuit’s nonobviousness standard); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006) (considering the requirements for a patent injunction); see also Mark D. Janis, Patent
Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387-88 (discussing
the absence of Supreme Court review of Federal Circuit decisions from the Federal Circuit’s
inception in 1982).
2. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (considering inequitable conduct doctrine); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Mass. Inst. of
Tech., 419 F. App’x 989 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (discussing divided infringement claims);
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (determining
the scope and purpose of the written description requirement); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (discussing patentable subject matter).
3. See, e.g., Symposium, The Future of Patents: Bilski and Beyond, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1245
(2011) (containing articles on the Supreme Court’s Bilski decision and the state of patentable
subject matter in patent law); Symposium, Nonobviousness—The Shape of Things to Come,
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s KSR decision and the
nonobviousness doctrine); John Golden, Commentary, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies,
85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007) (examining the eBay decision and remedies in patent law).
4. Oskar Liivak is also looking into this fundamental question, although he is
approaching it from a constitutional and statutory angle as opposed to this Article’s focus on
patent theory. See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1 (2012). Other authors have started down the road of defining invention and
have abandoned it for a legal realist approach. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of
Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2011). Another related
discussion examines the interaction between intellectual property protection and tangible
versus intangible “things.” See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts,
and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (2005).
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law. Patent law begins any inquiry by testing the invention for
whether it is worthy of patent protection—that is, whether it is
patentable.5 Then, if the invention is patent eligible, the inquiry
shifts to determining the scope of exclusivity awarded to the in-
vention and whether others have infringed upon those relevant
rights.6 Given the invention’s central role, determining what exactly
is the invention being considered becomes crucial to any patent
inquiry.
To unearth whether disputes over the concept of invention sit at
the middle of recent doctrinal conflicts, this Article looks at two
major doctrinal questions in dispute in recent years. The first is how
patent claims, which define the patent’s exclusivity, are interpreted.
Patent claim methodology is always a source of contention between
parties.7 And although the Federal Circuit went en banc in 2005 in
an attempt to dispel any ambiguities, follow-on panel opinions still
vary in their approaches to interpreting claims.8 The second doc-
trinal area is the written description requirement—a patentability
requirement dictating what needs to be described in the patent
document to qualify for patent protection.9 The exact contours of
this validity requirement, and even whether it actually exists, have
garnered much judicial and academic attention over the last twenty
years, prompting the Federal Circuit to go en banc in 2009 to clarify
the doctrine.10 Whether the court’s 2009 decision squelched any
5. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2006) (setting forth the patentability requirements);
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 67 (4th ed.
2007) (discussing the connection between patent eligibility and the other major patent
requirements).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 271; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 5, at 781-82.
7. David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 228 (2008) (“[Claim construction] is
often vigorously contested by the litigants, because claim construction is often the make-or-
break determination in patent litigation.”).
8. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see R. Polk
Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal
Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
LAW (S. Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 9), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1909028 (determining empirically that there is still variation in interpretation
methodology among Federal Circuit judges).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 112; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
10. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(setting out the written description requirement).
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disagreement over the requirement is still in question given recent
written-description decisions that prompted dissents on the issue.11
These are disputes in two very different doctrinal areas—one
focused on interpreting claims and defining the scope of exclusivity,
and the other asking whether the patent is eligible for protection to
begin with. But both are also perfect examples of the basic disagree-
ment driving most doctrinal conflicts in patent law today: a dis-
agreement over the definition of invention in patent law. 
The two competing definitions of invention are the “external
invention” and the “claim-centered invention.” Under the external
invention, the technical information and discussion contained in the
patent’s specification define the invention.12 The specification is the
more robust part of the patent and includes descriptions and
drawings of the state of the relevant technology, references to what
has been done before, any specific implementations of the invention
known to the inventor, and a general description of the purpose or
goal of the invention.13 All of this information provides insight into
the inventor’s actual activities and appreciations regarding the
invention. That is, what the inventor considers to be her invention
and how she has implemented it, or at least plans to implement it,
define the external invention. The claim-centered invention, in con-
trast, is defined by the patent’s claims.14 A claim is a single sentence
at the end of a patent that describes what the inventor wishes to
have exclusivity over.15 The claim-centered invention views the
11. See, e.g., Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp., 635
F.3d 1373, 1384-86 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(dissenting from the majority decision that the patent satisfied the written description
requirement).
12. See infra Part I.C.1.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (noting the requirements for the specification); 37 C.F.R. § 1.77(b)
(2010) (describing the specification’s contents); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim
Interpretation and Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 68-70 (2005) (describing
information-rich aspects of the specification); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose
Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 35-37),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762793; Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of
Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 641 (2010) (describing the technical information in
patents and how to improve such information).
14. See infra Part I.C.2.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.”).
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claim itself as the invention for patent law purposes.16 The claim
creates the invention and, accordingly, defines it.
Identifying these two definitions that sit at the center of the claim
interpretation methodology and written description disputes has
two main advantages. First, the definitions have significant explan-
atory power to distill doctrinal disputes to their core—the meaning
of invention in patent law. Second, the definitions allow doctrinal
choices to be judged against basic patent theory. 
This Article makes use of both advantages. The usage of these
definitions—the external and claim-centered invention definitions
—is first identified in the context of recent claim interpretation
methodology and written description decisions. The two definitions
are then examined against patent theory to determine which def-
inition better advances the reasons behind the patent system. This
Article concludes that the external definition of invention comes
closer to defining exclusivity in a manner assumed by both the
incentive-to-invent and prospect theories.17 Both of these theories
suppose that patent protection is at least centered on the inventor’s
actual inventive activities and understandings, not on a legal fiction
such as the patent claim.18 Thus, the external invention, although
not perfect, produces the best fit with these common patent nar-
ratives.19
Finally, explicitly choosing a definition of invention has numerous
doctrinal ramifications. The correct answers to the existing debates
on claim interpretation methodology and the written description
requirement become clear once one uses the external invention.20
Under the external invention approach claims should be interpreted
in light of the specification and a robust, independent written
description should be required. Using the external invention also
makes second-order effects on other patent doctrines become
16. See infra Part I.C.2.
17. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004) (describing the incentive-to-invent and prospect
theories); infra Parts II.A.1, B.1.
18. See infra Part II; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation
Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 115-24 (2005)
(using patent theory to select a claim interpretation methodology).
19. See infra Parts II.A.2, B.2.
20. See infra Part III.A.
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evident. An external invention means that claims should be
construed to preserve their validity.21 The external invention links
the specification and its embedded disclosure requirements with
claim meaning, forcing validity to be considered early.22 The re-
sulting narrow, literal claim meaning, tied tightly by the external
definition to the specification’s particular description of the inven-
tion, will leave room for a rebirth of, and reinvigorated reliance on,
the doctrine of equivalents.23 Broader protection will be needed to
further patent policy in some cases, and the doctrine of equivalents
will be needed once again to play this role. 
The Article begins in Part I by describing the disagreements that
are present in current case law in both claim interpretation meth-
odology and the written description requirement. Then, the Article
describes the underlying competing definitions of invention—
external and claim-centered—and identifies those two competing
definitions within these two doctrinal disputes. Part II presents the
two most common justifications for the patent system: the incentive-
to-invent and prospect theories. In light of these theories, the Article
evaluates the two invention definitions to see which definition best
fits with the theories’ assumptions regarding patent exclusivity.
Part III of the Article then looks back at the doctrinal conflicts
described earlier and determines how the selection of a definition of
invention resolves any open issues. The Article concludes by inves-
tigating the secondary doctrinal impacts of choosing a singular
definition: the external invention.
21. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
22. See infra Part III.B.1.
23. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 959 (2007) (“Courts can address these imperfections with
the doctrine of equivalents, which effectively expands patent claims beyond their literal scope
to devices that are not very different from the patented invention.”); Lee Petherbridge, On the
Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371, 1386-88 (2010).
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I. TWO MODERN CONFLICTS IN PATENT LAW DOCTRINE AND THE
UNDERLYING DEFINITIONS OF INVENTION 
Although disagreements exist in many areas of patent law,24 two
of the most pronounced disagreements in recent years involve
evaluating the patent document itself. The first disagreement is the
process of interpreting patent claims—single sentences found at the
end of the patent. Patent claims define the area of exclusivity
granted by the patent.25 Accordingly, the interpretation of the claims
is the crucial first step in any patent inquiry.26 The second disagree-
ment is the viability and independence of the written description
requirement for patentability.27 This dispute revolves around what
the patent’s drawings and descriptions must say about the claimed
invention for the claims to be patentable.28 
24. See, e.g., Kappos v. Hyatt, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (granting certiorari to determine the
standard of review courts should apply to findings of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011) (granting
certiorari on the operation of the Hatch-Waxman Act on claims of generic drugs infringing
brand drugs’ patents); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3027
(2011) (granting certiorari on the scope of the patentable subject matter requirement as
applied to personalized medicine claims).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); see Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S.
336, 339 (1961) (“[T]he claims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant.”);
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent
define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” (quoting
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir.
2004))). 
26. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (“The rights of the plaintiff depend
upon the claim in his patent, according to its proper construction.” (quoting Masury v.
Anderson, 16 F. Cas. 1087, 1088 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 9,270)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting
that claim interpretation is the first step of the patent infringement analysis).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention.”); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
28. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340 (evaluating whether there is a “separate written description
requirement”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 161-63
(2006) (arguing that the only role of the written description is to prevent “the addition of new
matter to the patent application”); Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with
the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62-69 (2000) (investigating whether there is an independent written
description requirement and concluding that any distinction is artificial).
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Although these disagreements occur in two separate doctrinal
areas of patent law, the conflicts have a common root. Both are
grounded in a fundamental disagreement about what the “inven-
tion” being considered is—that is, what the “invention” the claims
define and the patent describes. Below, in addition to describing
these doctrinal disagreements, this Part explores the underlying
link between them—the definition of invention. This Part then
explains the two definitions of invention, the “external” invention
and “claim-centered” invention, and identifies their presence in the
discourse. 
A. Conflict in Claim Interpretation Methodology
Every patent is required to end with at least one claim.29 Claims
are single sentences in which the patentee is required, by statute,
to particularly identify the invention over which she wants exclusiv-
ity.30 Although it has evolved over time, the law currently views
claims as defining the contours—the outer bounds—of patent
protection.31 Under this “peripheral claiming” approach, the claims
define the “fence” around the specific technology the patent holder
can exclude others from practicing.32 
It comes as no surprise that defining the exact metes and bounds
of the claim is a crucial step in patent law. To do so, the claim’s
terms must be given meaning. The exact locations of the fence must
be determined. The broader the meaning given, the greater the area
of protection obtained, and vice versa.33 
29. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims.”).
30. See id.; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) (“It has long
been understood that a patent must describe the exact scope of an invention and its
manufacture to ‘secure to [the patentee] all to which he is entitled, [and] to apprise the public
of what is still open to them.’” (alterations in original) (quoting McClain, 141 U.S. at 424)).
31. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (“This distinct and formal claim is,
therefore, of primary importance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is
patented.”).
32. John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 309-10; Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents,
20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134, 134-47 (1938) (discussing the history of patent claims); William
Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 757
(1948).
33. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 18, at 128 (noting that how claims are interpreted
impacts the scope of patent protection). 
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A major area of conflict regarding claim terms is how one goes
about interpreting them. Claim interpretation methodology, like
many other areas of legal interpretation,34 breaks down into two
general approaches—one that focuses on the plain language of the
claims with the other relying on additional information within the
patent, such as the drawings and descriptions in the specification,
to inform claim meaning.35 
Patents include a lot of information beyond the claims them-
selves. The patent specification, for example, which is the part of the
patent beside the claims, includes drawings and textual descriptions
of the invention—both in general terms and in specifics.36 The
patent specification usually describes embodiments of the inven-
tion, which are specific exemplars of how someone could actually
build and use the invention.37 Patents can even provide a general
background on the relevant technology and descriptions of prior
solutions.38
The two competing claim interpretation methodologies turn on
whether and how much the specification should dictate claim
meaning.39 Patent law speaks of not reading limitations from the
34. See E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 959
(1967); Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 496 (2004) (“[A]lmost all applications of legal doctrine turn on
questions of interpretation; and almost all questions of interpretation implicate the tension
between form and substance.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 424-28 (1989) (outlining competing theories of statutory
interpretation). Scholars have even applied these interpretation discussions directly to the
claim interpretation methodology. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Moore, A Patent Panacea? The
Promise of Corbinized Claim Construction, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 2-4 (2010)
(applying theories of contract interpretation to choose a method of claim interpretation).
35. Cotropia, supra note 18, at 74, 79-82 (describing questions regarding claim
interpretation methodology as degrees of influence of the specification); see also R. Polk
Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of
Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1133-36, 1149-56, 1170-72 (2004) (detailing
the current trends in claim interpretation methodology).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (noting the requirements for the specification); 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.77(b) (2010) (describing the specification’s contents); Cotropia, supra note 13, at 68-70
(describing the invention-specific information-producing rules that dictate the makeup of the
specification); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 546-47, 568-70, 574
(2009).
37. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.81 (requiring the patent applicant to furnish a drawing of his
invention).
38. Id. § 1.77(b)(6).
39. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“The role
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specification into the claims but also of reading the claims in light
of the specification.40 There is, not surprisingly, a very fine line
between these two methodologies. When there is a particular design
described in the specification but generalist claim language, a court
must decide which controls and how the narrower example informs
the meaning of the more general terms.41
These conflicting approaches came to a head when the Federal
Circuit attempted to definitively answer this question in Phillips v.
AWH Corp., an en banc decision, in 2005.42 In that case, the ques-
tion centered on the meaning of the claim term “baffles” placed
inside modular walls.43 The plain meaning of the term “baffles” said
nothing about the baffles’ orientation within the walls’ shell.44
However, the patent specification’s embodiments showed them dis-
placed at various angles within the shell, never orienting them-
selves perpendicularly to the walls’ exterior.45 The specification even
discussed the reason for such baffles and their angular orientation
—to obstruct projectiles, such as bullets in a combat or prison
setting, sound, or fire.46
The dispute in Phillips frames the classic question in claim
interpretation methodology: Should the court interpret the term
of the specification in claim construction has been an issue in patent law decisions in this
country for nearly two centuries.”); Cotropia, supra note 18, at 74, 79-82 (contrasting “[t]wo
often cited interpretation canons [that] illustrate the friction surrounding the specification’s
use in construing claims”); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 35, at 1133-34 (describing the
“tension inherent in two generally accepted ... ‘canons’ of claim construction”).
40. Compare In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 300 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (“Claims must always be read
in the light of the specification. Here, the specification makes plain what appellants did and
did not invent.”), with SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d
1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he district court ... committed one of the cardinal sins of
patent law—reading a limitation from the written description into the claims.”).
41. See Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“[T]here is sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and
reading a limitation into the claim from the specification.”); 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 3.02[1][g][ii][B] & n.89 (2011) (“The line between interpreting claim language in
light of the specification and reading a limitation from the specification into the claim is a fine
one.”).
42. 415 F.3d at 1312 (indicating that the court will, once again, address the role of the
specification in claim construction).
43. Id. at 1324-25.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Id. at 1329-30.
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“baffles” to simply mean a baffle, regardless of angular orientation
within the wall? Or, should the specification influence the meaning
of “baffle” and, if so, to what extent? As the Federal Circuit put it,
“The principal question that this case presents to us is the extent to
which we should resort to and rely on a patent’s specification in
seeking to ascertain the proper scope of its claims.”47
The en banc majority appeared to side with a methodology that
relied upon the specification in arriving at the claims’ meaning.48
The court noted that “[t]he claims, of course, do not stand alone.
Rather, they are part of ‘a fully integrated written instrument.’”49
The specification plays an important role given the statutory
linkage between it and the claim.50 The specification is tasked with
both describing and teaching how to make and use the invention,
and thus this fuller description in the same patent document should
influence the claim, which defines the contours of the invention.51 
This push toward a specification-influenced claim interpretation
methodology also led the court to reject a movement within the
court emphasizing dictionary definitions of claim terms ahead of the
language of the specification.52 The court found that such an ap-
proach of relying primarily on external definitional sources improp-
erly “limits the role of the specification.”53 Determining claim
meaning by primarily using dictionaries “is inconsistent with [the
Federal Circuit’s] rulings that the specification is ‘the single best
guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”54 
47. Id. at 1312 (majority opinion).
48. See Cotropia, supra note 18, at 90-91 (concluding that the court in Phillips adopted
the “specification methodology”); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 8 (manuscript at 9)
(determining that Phillips adopted a “Holistic” methodology). 
49. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
50. Id. at 1315-16.
51. Id. at 1315 (“[T]he descriptive part of the specification aids in ascertaining the scope
and meaning of the claims inasmuch as the words of the claims must be based on the
description. The specification is, thus, the primary basis for construing the claims.” (quoting
Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
52. Id. at 1319-21 (rejecting the Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d
1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002), line of cases).
53. Id. at 1319-20.
54. Id. at 1321 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
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However, in the end, the court found that even when looking at
the claims in the context of the specification, the term “baffles”
should not be limited beyond its plain meaning.55 The patent’s spec-
ification described the purposes of the claimed “baffles” to “check,
impede, or obstruct flow” of objects such as projectiles or sound.56
The drawings in the specification showed the baffles at angles to the
exterior walls, with one depicting a “bullet path” deflecting from an
angular baffle.57 The court, however, determined that such descrip-
tions did not require the baffles to be disposed at angles to achieve
the advantages of having baffles.58 
The disconnect from the majority’s recitation of the proper
methodology for interpreting claims—relying on the specification—
and its actual interpretation of the claims—discounting the specifica-
tion’s description—exemplifies the continuing doctrinal conflict
and the sometimes schizophrenic approach of the Federal Circuit in
this area. The articulated law in Phillips falls more toward a spec-
ification-oriented interpretation methodology whereas the actual
analysis falls more in the claim-language-oriented camp of claim
construction.59 
Judge Lourie, in his concurrence in part and dissent in part with
Judge Newman, highlighted the Phillips majority’s schizophrenic
approach.60 Judge Lourie agreed with the majority’s “resolving [of]
the relative weights of specification and dictionaries in interpreting
patent claims, in favor of the specification.”61 However, Judge Lourie
could not see how, when following this approach to claim interpre-
tation, the majority adopted a broad interpretation of “baffles.”62
Judge Lourie noted that “the specification contains no disclosure of
55. Id. at 1324-27.
56. Id. at 1325.
57. Id. at 1325-26.
58. Id. at 1325-27 (“Accordingly, we conclude that a person of skill in the art would not
interpret the disclosure and claims of the '798 patent to mean that a structure extending
inward from one of the wall faces is a ‘baffle’ if it is at an acute or obtuse angle, but is not a
‘baffle’ if it is disposed at a right angle.”).
59. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
60. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328-30 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id. at 1328.
62. Id. at 1329.
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baffles at right angles” and that angled baffles are the only baffles
that meet the technology’s goal of deflecting bullets.63
And the conflict goes on. Although Phillips attempted to settle the
age-old question of how to use the specification to interpret the
claim, the disagreement between the majority and the dissent shows
that there is still divergence on how to properly interpret claims.
Opinions after Phillips switch between methodologies; some rely
mainly on the claim language’s plain meaning whereas others
depend heavily on the specification’s text and drawings.64 R. Polk
Wagner and Lee Petherbridge’s continuing study of post-Phillips
opinions empirically establishes this fact: Federal Circuit claim
interpretation approaches still change from panel to panel after
Phillips.65
B. Conflict in Application of the Written Description Requirement
The written description requirement for patent protection is also
the focus of recent academic discourse and an en banc decision of
the Federal Circuit.66 Although patent claim interpretation focuses
on telling patent players67 what claims mean, the validity require-
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1303-05
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (relying heavily on the specification to interpret the claims); MBO Labs., Inc.
v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[P]atent coverage is not
necessarily limited to inventions that look like the ones in the figures. To hold otherwise
would be to import limitations onto the claim from the specification, which is fraught with
‘danger.’” (citations omitted) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323; Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d
1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).
65. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 8 (manuscript at 27) (“The empirical analysis
presented here suggests—strongly—that the Phillips decision has to date not had any
significant measurable effect on either the jurisprudence of claim construction at the Federal
Circuit, or on our (admittedly imperfect) measures of stability and predictability of the
doctrine.”).
66. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(“Because of the importance of the issue, we granted Ariad’s petition.”); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 795 (2011) (“The use of the written
description in this fashion has been harshly criticized, both by judges on the court and
commentators, as a standardless requirement that effectively grants the Federal Circuit
discretion to strike down claims that it simply believes are too broad, regardless of what
someone in the technological field might think.”). 
67. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 489-
94 (2004) (dividing up these patent players into three groups: avoiders, transactors, and
builders).
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ments test whether the interpreted claims deserve patent protec-
tion.68 For an invention to gain patent protection, the invention
must meet certain patentability standards—namely, the invention
must be novel, nonobvious, and useful.69 The patent laws also
dictate what the inventor must disclose in the patent beyond just
the claims. These disclosure requirements focus on what the inven-
tor tells the public about the invention, not whether the invention
reached the required level of technical progress for protection.70
These various disclosure requirements are found in 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The two disclosure requirements of import to this Article are the
enablement requirement and the written description requirement.71
The enablement requirement forces the inventor to describe to
someone skilled in the relevant technology how to practice—that is,
make and use—the invention without undue experimentation.72
This requirement has deep historic roots and its contours are fairly
settled.73 Enablement ensures that, when the patent does expire,
the claimed technology truly passes into the public domain.74 At the
patent’s expiration, not only does exclusivity go away, but the public
is also left with information on how to make and use what was being
excluded.75
In contrast to enablement, the written description requirement
has proven more controversial. Although enablement is all about
68. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
69. Id. §§ 101-103 (setting forth these requirements for patentability).
70. Id. § 112 (reciting the written description, enablement, and best mode requirements).
71. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that
the specification must “enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice ‘the full scope of the
claimed invention’” (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993))); Vas-Cath
Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (applying the written description
requirement).
72. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding that the patent’s specification did not violate the enablement requirement, even
though some experimentation was necessary).
73. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1343 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (quoting the 1836 Patent Act that codified the modern enablement requirement).
74. See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating the
rationale for the enablement requirement); Fromer, supra note 36, at 548-49 (“Disclosure ...
permits society at large to apply the information by freely making or using the patented
invention after the expiration of the patent.”).
75. See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (“[T]he
quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the
art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has expired.”).
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teaching how to implement the invention, the written description
requirement is focused on whether the patent describes the inven-
tion in enough detail to establish that the inventor actually did
invent the technology over which she is now claiming exclusivity.76 
Two points of contention currently surround the written descrip-
tion requirement. The first is whether any real difference exists be-
tween the written description inquiry and the enablement inquiry.77
If the inventor teaches someone how to make and use the claimed
technology, then has she not necessarily shown that she invented it
as well?78 Or is there a difference between teaching use and showing
possession of the invention? The second question is whether the
written description requirement should apply to claims in the orig-
inally filed patent application.79 If aspects of the technology fall
within the limits of the originally filed claims, then necessarily, has
not the inventor described that technology and shown that she
invented it at the time of filing?80 Or does the inventor need to
provide a more detailed description than a mere articulation of the
boundaries of the invention in a claim to meet the written descrip-
tion requirement? These questions arose after the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals’s 1967 decision in In re Ruschig regarding the
written description doctrine,81 if not earlier, and they were most
recently the subject of the Federal Circuit’s much anticipated en
banc decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.82
76. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(explaining what would satisfy an adequate written description of a DNA); Fiers v. Revel, 984
F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (same).
77. Holbrook, supra note 66, at 795 (noting the disagreement over whether there is an
independent written description requirement).
78. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that the written description requirement collapses into the
enablement requirement).
79. Id. at 1313 (“[T]he traditional written description requirement as applied by this court
and its predecessor beginning in 1967 will prohibit any addition of new matter to the patent
document.”).
80. Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description Requirement
in Patent Examination, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1665, 1670 (2010) (“Originally filed patent claims
are typically self-describing.”).
81. 379 F.2d 990, 995-96 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (rejecting a patent application because the
written description did not clearly convey that appellants invented the subject matter of the
patent).
82. 598 F.3d 1336, 1344-47 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that the written description
requirement was distinct from enablement).
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Ariad involved technology regarding the regulation of gene
expression by transcription factors, specifically a transcription
factor named NF-êB.83 The inventors noticed that artificially inter-
fering with NF-êB activity could reduce the harmful side effects of
certain diseases.84 The patent at issue claimed “methods for reg-
ulating cellular responses to external stimuli by reducing NF-êB
activity in a cell.”85
The written description issue in the case arose because the claims
were directed to “the use of all substances that achieve the desired
result of reducing” NF-êB activity in cells.86 They were so-called
genus claims, encompassing a variety of methods of performing the
claimed function—reducing NF-êB activity.87 The patent’s specifica-
tion stated this desired goal of reducing NF-êB activity and then
“hypothesize[d] three types of molecules with the potential to reduce
NF-êB activity in cells: decoy, dominantly interfering, and specific
inhibitor molecules.”88 That is, the patent discussed three species
within the claimed genus. This perceived disconnect between the
genus claims and the specific examples in the specification
prompted a written description challenge. After a jury found no
written description problem and a Federal Circuit panel reversed,
the whole court decided to take the case en banc to answer open
questions surrounding the doctrine.89
In its 2010 en banc decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
existence of a written description requirement distinct from en-
ablement.90 According to the court, the plain language of § 112
paragraph 1 and Supreme Court precedent dictated this result.91
And although it admitted that in most cases “written description
and enablement often rise and fall together,” the court concluded
cases will exist in which “a written description of the invention
plays a vital role in curtailing claims that do not require undue
83. Id. at 1340.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1341.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1340.
90. Id. at 1344-45.
91. Id. at 1344-47.
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experimentation to make and use, and thus satisfy enablement, but
that have not been invented, and thus cannot be described.”92 
Ariad’s patent was an example of one such case. The court noted
that the patent included only “a vague functional description and an
invitation for further research” and “provide[d] no example mole-
cules” that demonstrated the claimed reduction in NF-êB activity.93
The decoy molecules mentioned in the specification were not linked
to reducing NF-êB activity, the claimed invention.94 Instead, the
patent contained a description of a desired outcome, as opposed to
specific examples of how to achieve this outcome.95 
The court also concluded in Ariad that original claims are not
necessarily self-describing.96 “For example, a generic claim may de-
fine the boundaries of a vast genus of chemical compounds, and yet
the question may still remain whether the specification, including
original claim language, demonstrates that the applicant has
invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus.”97 Original
claims become particularly problematic when they use functional
language to claim a desired result but do not describe the invention
of something that achieves that result.98 
The court found that Ariad’s patent was an example of such a
situation, with broad claims encompassing every method of reducing
NF-êB activity but with only a description of a “decoy-molecule
hypothetical” in the specification.99 The claims by themselves did
not provide enough detail to show that the inventor had invented
what she was claiming.100 
Not all of the Federal Circuit judges agreed.101 The dissenters in
Ariad, including current Chief Judge Rader, believed that such an
interpretation of the written description requirement “perpetuates
an unnecessary tension between the claims and the written
92. Id. at 1352.
93. Id. at 1356.
94. Id. at 1357-58.
95. Id. at 1357.
96. Id. at 1349.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1350.
99. Id. at 1358.
100. Id. at 1357-58.
101. Id. at 1339.
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description as the definition of a patented invention.”102 Judge Linn
noted that “[i]t is inconsistent to say that on its filing date, a patent
does not show that the inventor ‘possessed’ subject matter that the
claims actually encompass and the specification fully enables.”103 
The focus now, just as it was with claim interpretation methodol-
ogy and Phillips, is on application of the en banc decision. Early
applications, with continued dissents in written description deci-
sions after Ariad, indicate that the disagreements over the doctrine
have not gone away.104 
C. The Common Thread—Two Competing Definitions of       
Invention—“External” Versus “Claim-Centered” Invention
The two patent law areas discussed above appear to be distinct.
Claim interpretation impacts the patent grant’s breadth of exclus-
ivity, whereas the written description requirement considers a
patent’s validity. 
However, the basics of the discussions in both areas are quite
similar. For starters, both debates concern the interaction of the
patent claim with the specification. In claim interpretation, the
question is how much the specification can inform, and in turn limit,
the claim’s meaning. The written description discussion considers
whether claim language is always enough to establish actual in-
vention or whether the specification should be referenced to answer
this inquiry. Both Phillips and Ariad wrestled with which part of
the patent should dominate the patent inquiry—the claims or the
specification. 
This similarity between the doctrinal debates prompts a funda-
mental patent law question that goes beyond these particular
disputes and the simple interaction between parts of the patent
document: What exactly is the “invention” for purposes of patent
law? Clashes over claim interpretation methodology and the written
description requirement are really disputes over two competing
definitions of invention. One definition that surfaces is an external
102. Id. at 1371 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp., 635
F.3d 1373, 1384-86 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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one—that is, an “invention” is defined by activities and observations
outside the patent document itself and existing prior to the patent’s
drafting. The second definition is an internal one, with the patent
document, particularly the claims, creating the “invention,” or at
least dominating its definition. These two concepts of invention—an
“external invention” and a “claim-centered invention”—are further
defined and then explored in detail below by again looking at the
doctrinal disputes discussed above.
1. “External Invention” Defined
The “external invention”  is an invention that exists independ-
ently of the patent document and prior to the filing of the patent
application. The inventor defines it by engaging in some real-space
activities and recognitions, which can range from the simple—notes
and diagrams on a tablecloth105—to the complex—the actual build-
ing and commercialization of the invention before filing the patent
application.106 
External invention requires the inventor to conceive of the in-
vention prior to filing. Conception, as patent law defines it, is the
“formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent
idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be
applied in practice.”107 This idea, “so clearly defined in the inventor’s
mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the
invention to practice, without extensive research or experimenta-
tion,”108 is the external invention. It may or may not be communi-
cated to anyone prior to patent filing, but it has a concreteness that
facilitates its use in real space. 
This external invention finds its way into the patent document
via the specification. The specification contains many details about
what the inventor thinks and has done regarding the invention. As
I have noted in a previous work: 
105. See Nat’l Tractor Pullers Ass’n v. Watkins, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 892, 901 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (describing the drawing of a tractor-pulling device on a tablecloth).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
107. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(quoting 1 ROBINSON ON PATENTS 532 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890)).
108. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
2012] WHAT IS THE “INVENTION”? 1877
The specification ... usually includes additional invention-specific
information. The specification frequently includes a background
of the invention. This background section describes the problem
the patented invention addresses and any prior attempts to
solve the same or similar problems. The specification also
includes a summary of the invention indicating the invention’s
nature, substance, and purpose. After this background and
overview, the specification provides a detailed description of the
invention. In this detailed description, the patentee sets forth
specific embodiments of the invention—working examples or
uses of the patent invention. This detailed description is
supplemented with drawings. These drawings can consist of
detailed figures, flowcharts, or diagrammatic views of the
invention and any described embodiments. An appendix can
follow the specification, including, for example, tables of data,
computer code, or “sequence listings” for genetic inventions.109
 
The specification takes the external, real-space activities of the
invention and memorializes them within the four corners of the pat-
ent document.110 The specification, particularly outside the claims,
gives the inventor the freedom to describe the external invention in
more detail and to use tables, graphs, figures, flowcharts, and pic-
tures, in addition to words.111 
The external definition of invention does not consider the claims
irrelevant. The claims still provide a means by which the inventor
can indicate what parts of her external invention—described in the
specification—she wishes to protect.112 And the claims themselves
are part of the specification, so they can also provide information
109. Cotropia, supra note 13, at 70 (footnotes omitted).
110. 37 C.F.R. § 1.77 (2010).
111. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; 37 C.F.R. § 1.77; Fromer, supra note 36, at 546-47. Many have
noted that the specification, although including more information about what the inventor has
done and considered, is “sanitized, modulated, or otherwise transformed by the legal pencil.”
See, e.g., id. at 567-68; Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 224-25 (2007) (suggesting the quality of information in the patent’s
specification should be improved). 
112. Duffy, supra note 32, at 308-09 (“One benefit of early claims is that they could protect
an inventor against invalidation of a patent on the ground that the patent did not ‘distinguish
the [invention] from all other things before known.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Patent
Act of 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321)).
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about the external invention to the extent that their restrictive form
allows.113 
Figure 1, below, graphically depicts the external invention and its
interaction with the specification and the claims. The extent of the
specification’s description—the memorialization of the external
invention as conceived by the inventor—are depicted as a circle and
define the broadest definition of the external invention.114 Accord-
ingly, claims, represented by solid dots, that capture subjects that
fall entirely within the specification’s description also fall within the
external invention’s definition. In contrast, claims that capture
technology that is not fully within the specification’s description fall
outside the reach of the broadest definition of the external inven-
tion.115
Figure 1 - External Invention
 Claim Outside 
External 
Invention’s 
Definition 
Claim Within 
External 
Invention’s 
Definition 
Extent of 
Specification’s 
Description 
113. 35 U.S.C. § 112; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
114. There is overlap between the large specification circle and the smaller solid claim
circles because the claims are necessarily part of the specification. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
However, as discussed in Ariad Pharmaceuticals., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349-
50 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), the claims may attempt to capture subject matter that they do
not adequately describe, such as with genus claims and a specification that describes narrow
species. 
115. See Cotropia, supra note 18, at 114-15 (explaining Figure 4, which demonstrates that
when “the resulting claim scope is tied only loosely to the patent’s specification, the claim
scope can potentially expand well beyond the specification or even exclude parts of the
specification”).
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a. External Invention in Claim Interpretation
In the claim interpretation methodology debate, the arguments
for heavy reliance on the specification’s teachings to interpret the
claims use an external definition of invention.116 The discourse goes
deeper than merely asserting that the specification should be used.
These decisions base such an approach almost explicitly on the
concept of the invention at issue being an external invention. The
more the specification can control claim definition, the more the
methodology looks to the external invention—as memorialized in
the specification—to influence the scope of exclusivity. 
For example, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Phillips invoked the
concept of an external invention when it discussed proper claim
interpretation methodology.117 When the court discussed the claim’s
meaning, it focused on the specification in determining claim
meaning. As the court noted, claim terms must be read “not only in
the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term
appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
specification.... This court and its predecessors have long empha-
sized the importance of the specification in claim construction.”118 
The court then turned to the broader concept of the invention and
its role in interpretation.119 Here, it explicitly invoked the external
invention. As the court noted, the specification is important in claim
interpretation because “[u]ltimately, the interpretation to be given
a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full under-
standing of what the inventors actually invented and intended to
envelop with the claim.”120 Put another way, courts must go beyond
the claims to determine what the “inventors actually invented.”121
This full understanding of invention requires understanding the
specification’s teachings122—the basis for the external definition of
invention.
116. See supra Part I.A.
117. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313-14; Cotropia, supra note 18, at 90-91; Wagner &
Petherbridge, supra note 8 (manuscript at 9).
118. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313, 1315.
119. Id. at 1315-16.
120. Id. at 1316 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Società per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Then, in rejecting the earlier reliance on dictionaries when
interpreting claims, the court again adopted an external invention.
“The main problem with elevating the dictionary to such promi-
nence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words
rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the
patent.”123 The specification, as opposed to an outside source of
meaning such as a dictionary, needs to be the focus because “[t]he
patent system is based on the proposition that claims cover only the
invented subject matter.”124 Interpreting the claims “in the context
of the particular patent is likely to capture the scope of the actual
invention more accurately.”125 
These arguments for relying on the specification to interpret
claims stem from an external conception of invention. The Phillips
court noted that the claim language should not be “divorc[ed] ...
from the specification” because to do so would ignore “the actual
invention.”126 Contextualizing the claim meaning within the com-
plete patent document, full of information about the inventive
activity of the patentee and what she recognizes as her invention,
brings this external definition of invention into the claim interpreta-
tion process.
The dissent in a recent Federal Circuit decision, Arlington
Industries, Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., provides another ex-
ample of the external invention being used to justify this claim
interpretation approach.127 The patent in Arlington Industries de-
scribed a connector that can snap into an electrical junction box by
using one hand instead of two.128 The patent claims recited a “spring
metal adaptor” on the lead end of the connector that attaches the
connector to the junction box.129 The claim interpretation dispute
concerned this claim term—spring metal adaptor—and focused on
whether the term meant an adaptor with a split ring that would
allow the adaptor to narrow upon insertion into the electrical
junction box.130
123. Id. at 1321.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1323-24.
126. Id. at 1324.
127. 632 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
128. Id. at 1249.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1252.
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The dissent in Arlington Industries concluded that the claim term
did mean a split ring adaptor.131 The rationale was that the patent’s
specification required such a meaning.132 The dissent noted that the
patent described the “spring metal adaptor” as having an opening
“that results from not forming a complete circle.”133 The figures in
the specification showed the split adaptor and junction box openings
that would require such a split for the adaptor to fit.134 
Viewed in the context of Figure 1 above, the dissent viewed the
specification as teaching, at its broadest, an external invention that
includes only split ring adaptors. For the claims to conform to this
definition of invention, the claims—solid dots—must fall completely
within the specification’s teachings. By defining “spring metal
adaptor” to include only split ring adaptors, the claim would fall
within the circle in Figure 1 and be an allowable claim interpreta-
tion. To interpret the term more broadly would place the claim
partially outside the definition of external invention—outside the
bigger circle—because such meaning would capture nonsplit ring
adaptors.
The dissent then explicitly adopted an external definition of in-
vention and used this definition to support its claim interpretation
approach. “The bottom line of claim construction should be that the
claims should not mean more than what the specification indicates,
in one way or another, the inventors invented.”135 Given this stan-
dard, “the basic mandate is for claims to be interpreted in light of
the specification of which they are a part because the specification
describes what the inventors invented.”136 The dissent looked at the
specification to determine the breadth of the external invention and
in turn limited the claim’s meaning to this external invention—
“what the inventors invented.”137 As the dissent put it, “A patent is
a teaching document. In almost all cases, the inventors, and their
131. Id. at 1258 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 1257.
133. Id. at 1258 (noting the specification indicated that “[t]he circular metal spring adaptor
20 has an opening that results from not forming a complete circle” and that claim 1 described
“said circular spring metal adaptor [as] being less than a complete circle”).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1257-58.
136. Id. (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
137. Id. at 1258.
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patent solicitors, kn[o]w what was invented and generally disclose[]
their invention.”138 
The dissent concluded that “the inventor[s’] ... invention” in the
case “consisted only of spring metal adaptors with an opening that
results from not forming a complete circle”; that is, the metal
adaptor had a split.139 Put another way, the external invention, as
described in the patent’s text and figures, included only adaptors
with split ends. The dissent stayed true to this conception of inven-
tion by using the specification to interpret the claims.
b. External Invention and the Written Description         
Requirement
An external definition of invention supports an independent
written description requirement that can apply to original claims.
The debate regarding written description centers upon whether
the patent document must simply teach how to make and use the
claimed invention or whether it must show that the inventor
was actually in possession of the invention at the time of filing.
Decisions advocating for more than mere enablement in the patent
go beyond simply saying that a written description requirement is
mandated and explicitly invoke the concept of an external invention. 
For example, use of the external invention is found throughout
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Ariad. The court, in articulating the
test for written description, noted that “the description must ‘clearly
allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the
inventor] invented what is claimed.’”140 The specification must show
that the inventor “had possession of the claimed subject matter
as of the filing date.”141 Again, to determine what was “invented,” a
court must look at the specification, its memorialization of the
patentee’s inventive activities, and her recognition of such. 
The Ariad decision’s application of this written description re-
quirement also evidences a reliance on the external invention. The
claims were written to capture any way of inhibiting NF-êB
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
141. Id.
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activity.142 However, the specification provided no examples or de-
tails of how to do this.143 As the court noted, articulations of “a wish,
or arguably a plan for future research” is not enough.144 Within the
four corners of the patent, there needs to be evidence that the in-
ventor conceptualized the claimed invention by the time of filing.145
The court looks for real-space evidence of the invention, such as
examples or detailed theories of how the invention would work, to
meet the description requirement. This is the essence of the external
invention: external conceptualization of the invention.146 If the claim
is directed to something that is not found in the external invention,
then there is no written description support.
The court’s theoretical justification for this strong written de-
scription requirement also relied upon the recognition of an external
definition of invention. The court noted:
Patents are not awarded for academic theories, no matter how
groundbreaking or necessary to the later patentable inventions
of others. “[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward
for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.”
Requiring a written description of the invention limits patent
protection to those who actually perform the difficult work of
“invention”—that is, conceive of the complete and final invention
with all its claimed limitations—and disclose the fruits of that
effort to the public.147 
The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Centocor Ortho Biotech,
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories is another example of the external in-
vention driving a strong written description requirement.148 The
case involved use of antibodies to treat arthritis.149 Overproduction
of TNF- can cause arthritis, but TNF- antibodies can reduce the
142. Id. at 1355.
143. Id. at 1356.
144. Id. at 1357 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed Cir. 1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
145. Id.
146. See supra Part I.C.1.
147. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353 (quoting Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d
916, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
148. 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
149. Id. at 1344.
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effect of excessive TNF-.150 Humans, however, do not naturally
produce human TNF- antibodies.151 There was, therefore, a push
in the industry to create these antibodies artificially.152
Centocor developed a mouse antibody to human TNF-.153 While
the mouse antibody neutralized TNF- activity, it also prompted
an immune response in humans.154 To counteract this problem,
Centocor modified the constant region of the mouse antibody to look
human, creating what is known as a “chimeric” antibody.155 Based
on this research, Centocor obtained a patent, asserted in the case,
that claimed TNF- antibodies, including such antibodies that are
fully human and antibodies whose variable region, as opposed to
their constant region, is human.156 It then asserted these patent
claims against Abbott’s fully human TNF- antibodies.157
Written description was at issue because the asserted claims
recited human variable regions, whereas the patent’s specification
“d[id] not disclose any fully-human ... antibody” or “a single human
variable region.”158 Instead, “[t]he overwhelming majority of the ...
patent describes the A2 mouse antibody and the single chimeric
antibody that Centocor made based on A2’s mouse variable re-
gion.”159 Full human antibodies and human variable regions are
mentioned in “only a few sentences” in the patent’s specification.160
The Federal Circuit found no written description support for the
fully human antibody claim: 
[W]hile the patent broadly claims a class of antibodies that
contain human variable regions, the specification does not
describe a single antibody that satisfies the claim limitations. It
does not disclose any relevant identifying characteristics for
such fully-human antibodies or even a single human variable
region. Nor does it disclose any relationship between the human
150. Id.
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 1344-45.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1345.
156. Id. at 1345-46.
157. Id. at 1346.
158. Id. at 1348.
159. Id. at 1349.
160. Id. at 1350.
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TNF- protein, the known mouse variable region that satisfies
the critical claim limitations, and potential human variable
regions that will satisfy the claim limitations. There is nothing
in the specification that conveys to one of skill in the art that
Centocor possessed fully-human antibodies or human variable
regions that fall within the boundaries of the asserted claims.161
Placing this in the context of Figure 1 above, the specification’s
teachings do not include a TNF- antibody with a human region.
The specification circle is not large enough to encompass such
variations of the TNF- antibody. Accordingly, a claim that captures
such human antibodies falls outside the external invention. The
claim asserted in the case is the solid dot that falls partially outside
the specification’s teaching and thus is invalid because it does not
meet the written description requirement.
The analysis in Centocor, like that in Ariad, looked at the ex-
ternal invention to see whether the claim went beyond the “inven-
tion.”162 The specification in Centocor showed that the external
invention did not include fully human, or human variable regions,
of TNF- antibodies.163 The inventor was not in “constructive
possession” of these variants; nothing indicated that the inventor
“visualize[d] or recognize[d]” such inventions prior to filing.164 The
broader claim was, at best, a “mere wish or plan,” not an invention,
and particularly not part of the external invention.165 “[I]t was
entirely possible that no fully-human antibody existed that satisfied
the claims” at filing.166 “Centocor had not invented a fully-human ...
A2 specific antibody” because this type of antibody did not fall
within the inventor’s external invention, as evidenced by the
specification.167 Again, this line of reasoning is based on defining
invention externally—as these external activities and understand-
ings are described in the patent’s specification.
161. Id. at 1350-51 (citations omitted) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
119 F.3d 1559, 1566-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
162. See id. at 1348.
163. Id. at 1351.
164. Id. at 1353 (quoting Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1566-69).
165. See id. at 1349, 1351.
166. Id. at 1351.
167. Id.
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2. Claim-Centered Invention
The “claim-centered” definition of the invention focuses on the
patent claim, as opposed to the specification and external inventive
activities, to define the invention. Under this approach, the claim is
the invention. The invention is born from the claim, and claim
language dominates the invention’s definition. The claim-centered
invention takes 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 2 at its literal word—
that the patent shall end with “one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.”168 The claim-centered invention
falls in line with Judge Giles S. Rich’s famous saying “the name of
the game is the claim.”169 
Under this definition of invention, the specification plays a
secondary, and in some cases absent, role. Because the claim births
the invention, the claim dominates discussions regarding what the
invention is. The specification’s teachings cabin the claim’s scope in
only very limited situations.
Figure 2, below, graphically depicts the claim-centered invention.
Because the claim essentially defines the claim-centered invention
by itself, the invention’s definition does not constrain the claim from
falling partially outside the specification’s description. The claim,
again shown as a filled dot, is self-defining and thus self-contained
under this concept of invention. Where the claim goes, so goes the
definition of the invention. And the specification’s description
does little to dictate, and therefore little to restrain or center, the
meaning of invention. 
168. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). Congress recently amended this language by replacing
“applicant regards as his invention” with “inventor or a joint inventor regards as the
invention.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c)(1)-(2), 125 Stat. 284,
296 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 112).
169. See Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) (“The U.S. is strictly
an examination country and the main purpose of the examination, to which every application
is subjected, is to try to make sure that what each claim defines is patentable. To coin a
phrase, the name of the game is the claim.”).
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Figure 2 - Claim-Centered Invention
a. Claim-Centered Invention in Claim Interpretation 
A claim-centered concept of the invention promotes claim
interpretation methodologies that focus almost exclusively on the
claim language. Such methodologies stay true to a claim-centered
definition by limiting the use of the specification in determining
claim meaning. Put another way, those who focus on not reading
limitations from the specification into the claims, as opposed to
reading the claims in light of the specification, are adhering to a
claim-centered definition. A claim-centered view of invention
supports finding claim meaning in the claims themselves, not the
specification. 
Heavy reliance on dictionaries, discussed and rejected in Phillips,
provides an example of the use of a claim-centered invention in
claim interpretation.170 The Federal Circuit, in Texas Digital
Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc. and its progeny, instructed courts to
rely on dictionaries, and other external references, and to refer to
the specification only if the inventor explicitly defined a claim term
therein.171 As the court in Phillips noted, this approach “limit[ed]
 Claim Within 
Claim-Centered 
Invention’s 
Definition 
Claim Within 
Claim-Centered 
Invention’s 
Definition 
Extent of 
Specification’s 
Description 
170. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
171. 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also, e.g., SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV
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the role of the specification in claim construction to serving as a
check on the dictionary meaning of a claim term.”172 This focused
the interpretation “inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather
than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the
patent.”173 The dictionary-reliant methodology viewed the invention
being defined as very claim centered. Accordingly, the claims, not
the specification, dictate the meaning. This allows claim meaning to
be “divorced from the intrinsic evidence” and gives the terms
meaning “in the abstract, out of [their] particular context, which is
the specification.”174
The majority’s methodology in Arlington Industries, Inc. v.
Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., although it did not follow Texas Digital’s
reliance on dictionaries, was also based on a claim-centered
invention. In interpreting “spring metal adaptor,” the court initially
noted that “[c]onsistent with the ordinary and customary meaning
of these words, this term imposes the limitation that the adaptor
must be made of spring metal.”175 The claim language did not,
however, say whether a split in the adaptor was needed.176 The court
would import such a limitation into the claim only “if the specifica-
tion manifest[ed] a clear intent to limit the term by using it in a
manner consistent with only a single meaning.”177 Even though all
of the drawings showed a split adaptor, the court would not read
such a limitation in without “clear intent to limit the claims” as
such.178 The majority in Arlington Industries stayed true to a claim-
centered view of invention—allowing the claim language by itself to
dominate claim meaning.
Referring back to Figure 2, the claims, as the majority interpreted
them, included both the teachings of the specification—split
adaptors—and variations outside the teachings—nonsplit adaptors.
Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 874-75, 882, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (following Texas Digital and
adopting a dictionary definition for “search,” which the concurrence concluded went “far
beyond what the named inventors say they actually invented”). 
172. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320.
173. Id. at 1321.
174. Id.
175. Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
176. Id. at 1253-54.
177. Id. at 1254 (citing Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2004); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
178. Id.
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The claims straddled the edge of the specification’s description.
Because the court followed the claim-centered invention approach,
the fact that the interpreted claims fell partially outside the spec-
ification’s description was not problematic. The claim was self-
supporting and the invention being considered was centered around
the claim language. Thus, the claims needed support just from the
claim language, not from the specification. 
This aversion to reading in limitations from the specification,
witnessed in the earlier Texas Digital line of cases and cases such
as Arlington Industries, is based on a belief in the claim-centered
invention.179 The claims define the invention and accordingly create
the invention. Reading limitations from the specification to narrow
the interpreted invention runs counter to this view of invention.180
As the majority indicated in Arlington Industries, viewing the spec-
ification, not the claims, as the “‘heart of the patent’ ... devalues the
importance of claim language in delimiting the scope of legal
protection.”181 Because the claims define the invention under a
claim-centered approach, the claims’ meaning must necessarily
come from the claims themselves. 
b. Claim-Centered Invention and the Written Description
Requirement
Those decisions that reject an independent written description
requirement or the requirement applying to original claims based
this rejection on the claim-centered invention.182 Because, under this
definition, the claims create the invention, envisioning the claims
themselves as not adequately describing the invention is difficult.
Certainly, the specification may not teach someone how to practice
the claims and may thus fail to enable the claim. But if the inven-
tion is centered around the claims, then the claims will be enough
to show possession of the invention. Given that they are considered
179. See supra Part I.A (explaining the conflict between claim-centered and specification-
centered claim interpretation).
180. See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1312 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part) (“‘[A] bedrock principle of patent law’ [is] that the
claims themselves, not the written description portion of the specification, define the patented
invention.” (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc))).
181. Arlington Indus., 632 F.3d at 1255 n.2.
182. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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one and the same under this conception of invention, an independ-
ent written description inquiry, particularly for original claims, is
unnecessary.183 Because the claims are the invention, they always
describe the invention.
The dissents in Ariad relied on a claim-centered invention to
support their objections to an independent written description re-
quirement.184 As Judge Linn noted in his concurrence in part and
dissent in part, joined by then-Judge (and current Chief Judge)
Rader, “[i]t is inconsistent to say that on its filing date, a patent
does not show that the inventor ‘possessed’ subject matter that the
claims actually encompass and the specification fully enables.”185
The dissent also pointed out that “since the 1836 Patent Act, claims
have served the purpose of ‘distinguishing’ the invention, while the
specification as a whole must ‘enable.’”186 The dissent said that
claims by their definition describe the invention.187 This is the claim-
centered invention. And because claims are the instruments that
define the invention for patent law purposes, a separate written
description requirement is unnecessary. 
In Ariad, if the claims recited simply “inhibiting NF-êB activity,”
then they described inhibiting NF-êB activity, regardless of the
specific manner. If they failed to describe how to inhibit NF-êB
activity in any manner, they would have enablement issues but not
description problems.188 To conclude otherwise, the dissent noted,
would “perpetuate[ ] an unnecessary tension between the claims and
the written description as the definition of the patented inven-
tion.”189 The dissent adhered to a claim-centered invention, allowing
the claims to be self-describing. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the Ariad dissent’s reliance on a claim-
centered invention in its view of the written description require-
ment. If the invention is claim-centered, then the claims, the solid
dots, are the invention for patent law purposes. They do not need
183. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
184. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1361-67 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); id. at 1367-72 (Linn, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).
185. Id. at 1371 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
186. Id.
187. See id. at 1368.
188. See id. at 1371 (“[E]nablement polices those claims effectively.”).
189. Id.
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the description contained in the rest of the specification to meet the
written description requirement. They are descriptive by themselves
and thus can extend beyond the specification’s description, the
larger circle, and still be valid; they can exist outside that circle and
still meet the written description requirement.
The criticism of the Centocor decision is another example of the
claim-centered definition supporting a muted written description
requirement.190 In Centocor, as in Ariad, the claims recited a genus 
—any antibody with a human constant region and a human variable
region—while the specification recited a species of that genus—an
antibody with one specific variable region.191 Critics of the decision
would argue that the court should stop at the claims when deter-
mining whether an adequate description exists.192 If the claims
recited any antibodies with a human constant region and a human
variable region, then the inventor was in possession of such an in-
vention. To recite such subject matter in the claims is to have taken
possession of it.193 
II. USING PATENT THEORY TO CHOOSE A DEFINITION OF INVENTION
Describing the two definitions of invention at the center of
various patent doctrine discussions has tremendous explanatory
power. The definitions distill the fundamental disagreements to
their core—what definition of invention should patent law use?
Defining the invention we are trying to promote and protect in
patent law would resolve doctrinal disagreements at their base. 
This Part examines two diverse theories of why patent protection
is needed to determine the optimum definition of invention. To that
end, this Part first describes both of these theories—the “incentive-
190. See, e.g., Chris Holman, Centocor v. Abbott: The Federal Circuit Struggles to Articulate
a Coherent Standard for Compliance with the Lilly Written Description Requirement,
HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (Mar. 15, 2011, 2:30 PM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot
.com/2011/03/centocor-v-abbott-federal-circuit.html (arguing that the written description
requirement applied in Centocor “lacks any coherent doctrinal foundation”).
191. Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
192. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1371 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(arguing that, at best, this presents an enablement issue, not a written description problem).
193. See Holman, supra note 190 (concluding that the analysis in Centocor “is essentially
[the application of] the enablement standard”).
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to-invent” theory and the “prospect” theory of patent law.194 This
Part then evaluates each invention definition to see which comports
better with the narrative at the center of these two theories. Patent
theory provides a good set of first principles to determine which one
definition of invention is the “right” one, or, at the very least, better
than the other in promoting the ultimate goal of the patent system.
In the end, although neither definition fits both theories’ narratives
perfectly, the external invention comes the closest. 
A. Incentive-to-Invent Theory
1. The Story
The incentive-to-invent theory is the classic justification for the
patent system.195 Under this theory, patent law incentivizes the
creation of inventions by giving the inventor a mechanism by which
she can recoup her development costs: exclusivity.196 The incentive-
to-invent theory assumes the exclusive rights to the invention allow
the inventor to price the invention more like a monopolist, thus
above marginal cost.197 The potential for this additional revenue is
194. These are commonly cited theories for patent protection. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note
17, at 129-30, 132. Other theories of protection are not discussed in this Article. See id. at 130.
195. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving the United States Congress the power to grant
patents and copyrights in order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”); Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare.”); WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4-5 (2003)
(reviewing rationales for intellectual property and finding the economic rationale most
compelling); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1576-77, 1580 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997) (“Intellectual property is fundamentally about
incentives to invent and create.”). 
196. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The patent laws
promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development.”).
197. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1466-67 (2002). Parchomovsky and Siegelman
argue that
[A]bsent legal protection, competitors would copy such works without incurring
the initial costs of producing them. Unauthorized reproduction would drive down
the market price to the cost of copying, original authors and inventors would not
be able to recover their expenditures on authorship and R&D, and, as a result,
2012] WHAT IS THE “INVENTION”? 1893
what entices a would-be inventor to try to invent.198 This is an ex
ante theory in that the theory focuses on how patent law influences
activities prior to the creation of the invention and the vesting of
patent rights.199 
The full story is as follows: Inventing requires the expenditure of
resources, including the inventor’s time and the costs of research
and development.200 A would-be inventor will not attempt to invent
unless she can reasonably anticipate recouping her invention-
creating costs.201 The inventor cannot rely upon physical control of
the invention as a means of exclusivity because inventions are
“public goods” that are easily copied and that anyone can use
without depletion or depriving others of the invention’s use.202
Without the ability to control the invention, the inventor cannot
demand the price needed to recoup her costs and turn a profit.203 
too few inventions and expressive works would be created.
Id. at 1467.
198. Lemley, supra note 195, at 995-96 (noting that by giving inventors “control over the
use and distribution of their ideas,” intellectual property law “encourage[s] them to invest
efficiently in the production of new ideas and works of authorship”); Samson Vermont,
Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 503-04
(2006) (“Under current law, an inventor’s incentive to invent is a function of her expected
return under complete patent exclusivity weighted by the probability of obtaining that
exclusivity.”).
199. Lemley, supra note 17, at 129-30 (referring to the incentive to invent as the “ex ante
justification for intellectual property” law).
200. Lemley, supra note 195, at 994.
201. Id.
202. Burk & Lemley, supra note 195, at 1604-05 (“[I]nformation is a public good for which
consumption is nonrivalrous—that is, one person’s use of the information does not deprive
others of the ability to use it.”); Lemley, supra note 195, at 994-95; Joseph Scott Miller,
Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 667, 680-81 (2004) (discussing the “free rider problem,” the public good nature of
invention it creates, and how it “undercut[s] the incentive to invent”); Katherine J.
Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS.
L. REV. 81, 104-05 (“The production of patentable inventions is understood to be different from
other commercial activity because the investment in new ideas, unlike the investment in
capital equipment or materials, is assumed to be appropriable by competitors at very little
expense.”).
203. Lemley, supra note 195, at 994-95; see also Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson,
The Upside of Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 925-27 (2010) (“Once
an information good—say, a new drug or a book—is introduced into the marketplace, it
becomes subject to widespread competition because the innovation is a ‘public good’ that can
be easily copied and distributed without depleting its supply or depriving others of its use.
The price of the information good therefore drops to the marginal cost of production.”);
Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 197, at 1466-67.
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Patent law solves this conundrum by giving the inventor exclu-
sive control over the invention.204 This exclusivity allows the
inventor to price the invention like a monopolist.205 Not needing to
worry about competitors who might charge less for the same in-
vention, the inventor can charge more than merely the cost of
materials and time it takes to make each commercial embodiment
of the invention.206 This additional money allows her to recover her
sunk costs and turn a profit.207 By facilitating such a return, patents
create a carrot to prompt would-be inventors to take the plunge and
try to invent.208 Patent law, and the exclusivity it grants, makes the
endeavor worthwhile.
The incentive-to-invent theory usually assumes that the scope of
exclusivity is fairly narrow, tailored to the actual invention the
inventor created and is going to sell.209 This narrow protection is
204. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (defining the exclusivity that patent law provides); J.E.M.
AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131-33 (2001); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (noting that patent law promotes invention by granting
inventors exclusivity over their invention); Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing
Inventions and the Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 914-16
(2009) (“Patent law therefore bestows property rights on inventors of worthy technologies,
thus artificially rendering such discoveries excludable and allowing a market to develop for
the technology at issue.”).
205. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 203, at 927 (“This control allows rightsholders to
be price searchers, as opposed to price takers who must settle for a price equivalent to
marginal cost. The law thus allows rightsholders to engage in monopolistic pricing—or at
least pricing that would not be possible without the market power that intellectual property
confers.” (footnotes omitted)). The intellectual property right does not automatically give the
rightsholder market power over price. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965) (“There may be effective substitutes for the [patented]
device which do not infringe the patent.”).
206. See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253,
296 (2003) (“[F]rom an ex post perspective, excluding rivals from any property rights valuable
and unique enough to enjoy monopoly power will generally constrain consumer choice, lower
output, and raise prices, thus producing allocative inefficiency.”).
207. See Devlin & Sukhatme, supra note 204, at 915-16 (“Worse still, her inability to profit
from her invention might discourage her from working toward discovering the invention in
the first place. Patent law therefore bestows property rights on inventors of worthy
technologies, thus artificially rendering such discoveries excludable and allowing a market
to develop for the technology at issue.”).
208. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope,
61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 170 (2005) (“The incentive to invent is maintained by the
would-be inventor’s perception that she will get adequate protection to recoup costs.”).
209. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 203, at 931-32 (“Because innovation is often
cumulative, binding up old innovation in legal entitlements tends to increase development
costs for follow-on innovators, who need to use the old innovation as the basis for creating new
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seen as necessary to minimize the downside of exclusivity—the
capture of improvements and other downstream uses of the inven-
tion by the inventor.210 The story is that patent law wants to provide
enough control to facilitate reimbursement to the inventor and
entice invention but not provide so much exclusivity as to overcom-
pensate the inventor and choke off further developments.211 
2. Which Invention Definition Best Fits This Story?
The invention’s definition influences how patent law will
determine the scope of exclusivity—via claim interpretation—and
judge patentability—such as with the written description require-
ment. Patent law operates by first judging the validity of the
invention and then granting exclusivity over it.212 The external
definition focuses on the teachings of the specification as proxies
for what the inventor has done and recognized outside the patent
itself.213 In contrast, the claim-centered definition focuses on the
claim language itself.214 The question becomes which of these def-
initions allows the patent to operate as the incentive-to-invent
theory assumes the patent will. That is, which definition makes the
patent’s exclusivity fit best with the underlying story.
The external invention falls more in line with the incentive-to-
invent narrative. The various assumptions made by the theory are
more likely to be true if the invention to which protection is tied is
one external to the patent document as opposed to centered on the
claim language.
Protection, and more particularly the scope of protection, plays a
crucial role in the incentive-to-invent story. Exclusivity over the
invention provides the vehicle by which the inventor brings the
information goods.... Therefore, if intellectual property law is to maximize overall innovation,
it must strike a balance between too much protection and too little.”).
210. See generally Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in
Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1995).
211. See Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26
RAND J. ECON. 34, 35-36 (1995) (looking at how to balance protection between initial and
follow-on innovators); Ted O'Donoghue, A Patentability Requirement for Sequential
Innovation, 29 RAND J. ECON. 654, 673 (1998).
212. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563,
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]nvalid claim[s] cannot give rise to liability for infringement.”).
213. See supra Part I.C.1.a.
214. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
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invention to market, controls its price, and then recoups her
investment.215 Tailoring exclusivity to the invention also allows
protection to be narrow enough to allow follow-up inventions, which
may use or improve on the invention, to flourish.216 
The external definition of the invention is the best candidate to
tailor protection to the invention in the way that the incentive-to-
invent theory is talking about. The external definition uses infor-
mation about the actual construction or implementation of the
invention to inform the breadth of exclusivity. The descriptions and
drawings in the specification provide insight into how the invention
will look and operate in real space and, more importantly, how the
inventor believes it will look and operate.217 Using this definition,
exclusivity has a better chance of coinciding with what the inventor
has actually done and is going to do because the definition is formed
in the context of an actual or predicted configuration or use.218 The
definition also limits protection to these descriptions, leaving room
for others technologies the inventor is unlikely to develop, consider-
ing she has not recognized them in the patent’s specification. 
The specification does provide a limited snapshot, both in time
and depth, of how the inventor is going to proceed with the inven-
tion.219 In fact, patent law assumes that the patent is filed early in
the development process to provide protection and incentives
early.220 However, the external definition still provides insights into
the inventor’s real-world direction for the invention. Characteristics
of the invention may change before the invention goes on sale, but
they will vary from a defined, contextualized starting point de-
215. See supra notes 204-05.
216. See supra Part I.C.1 (explaining the external invention).
217. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1298, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Thus, a construction of ‘body’ that limits the term to a one-piece body is
required to tether the claims to what the specifications indicate the inventor actually
invented.”).
218. See Cotropia, supra note 18, at 117-20 (“[T]he patentee does not gain control over
every implementation of the invention unless the specification teaches every implementation.
The patentee gets enough protection to exclude others from copying the patentee’s exact work,
but not such broad protection as would likely give the patentee monopoly power.”).
219. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.77 (2010) (listing required elements of the specification, one of which
is a summary of the invention).
220. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 65, 78-81 (2009) (describing patent law’s incentives to filing early).
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scribed by the patent’s specification.221 The incentive-to-invent story
assumes patent law will use this contextualized invention and de-
mands that patent law provide protection for an invention that is
both created and eventually sold to the public.222 The incentive-to-
invent story assumes a strong link between these two iterations of
the invention, and the external definition tries to stay true to that
linkage.
In sharp contrast, the claim-centered invention does not reference
such information when defining protection. Instead, the definition
merely requires the inventor to contribute text—a single sen-
tence—and nothing more to obtain exclusive control over a given
technological area. A claim-centered definition invites disjointed-
ness between protection and the real-world contributions of the
inventor.223 Although the scope of protection may be commensurate
with the claim-centered invention’s real-space benefits, it is just as
likely that a technological area will be under the exclusive control
of an inventor who has not even thought of, let alone actually begun
to explore, technological development in that excluded area.224 In
the context of Figure 2 above, the claim-centered definition could
give control over a subject matter area—solid dot—falling well out-
side the specification’s teachings. This de-linking of the inventor’s
development process from actual patent protection pushes the
claim-centered invention out of line with the incentive-to-invent
story.225
The difference in exclusivity under the two definitions impacts
how the definitions fit with other aspects of the incentive-to-invent
story as well. First, the incentive-to-invent theory assumes the
existence of some research and development expenditures behind
the patented invention.226 The amount of expenditures varies; for a
221. See id. at 88-93 (discussing how development continues, and more technical and
market information is generated, after early filing).
222. See supra notes 204-05.
223. See Cotropia, supra note 18, at 123-24 (describing how a “heavy presumption” favoring
the claim language by itself “does not tune the resulting patent scope to any other aspect of
the patent, the invention, or the technology underlying the patent”). 
224. See id. at 123 (concluding that such a claim-centered approach “can create a claim
scope that fails to protect aspects of the invention altogether”). 
225. See id. at 120-21 (finding that a specification-oriented approach links claim meaning
with the inventor’s actual activities).
226. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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given invention some inventors may spend more or less.227 But the
existence of some costs associated with creation is what fuels the
need for protection of the completed invention to recoup such costs,
which in turn maintains an incentive to invent.228 The scope of
exclusivity is over the very thing—the invention—for which the
theory is trying to reimburse the inventor.
An external invention, by definition, invokes some inventive
activities prior to filing the patent.229 The invention is defined by the
inventor spending money and time on design, materials, experi-
ments, and prototypes230—all expenses related to a real-space inven-
tive process. When the invention’s definition is based on the
embodiments and actions described in the specification, develop-
ment activities influence the invention’s definition. These are the
activities for which the incentive-to-invent theory assumes the
inventor needs to be reimbursed to maintain the incentive to create.
In contrast, these research and development costs are not neces-
sarily associated with a claim-centered invention. The claims by
themselves say little about the effort expended in the creation of the
defined invention. Certainly, the inventor makes some prefiling in-
vestment in claim drafting, but this investment reflects the com-
plexity of wordsmithing, not the design and testing of the invention
itself.231 The investment in patent drafting is not the type contem-
plated by the incentive-to-invent theory. Nor is it likely to reach a
level that requires postinvention exclusivity to incentivize the
claim-centered invention’s creation. An external invention fits better
with the preinvention investment part of the incentive-to-invent
story.
The incentive-to-invent story also assumes that a product or
service embodying the invention will eventually go on sale.232 As the
227. Patents are not issued based on the amount invested into inventing. See Life Techs.,
Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he path that leads an
inventor to the invention is expressly made irrelevant to patentability by statute.”); Sean B.
Seymore, Essay, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185, 190 (2009) (discussing “accidental” discov-
eries).
228. See supra notes 204-05.
229. See supra Part I.C.1.
230. See supra notes 204-05.
231. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Describing Patents as Real Options, 34 J. CORP. L. 1127,
1135 (2009) (articulating the separate costs of drafting and filing a patent application).
232. See supra notes 204-05.
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story goes, price control via patent exclusivity allows the inventor
to recoup her investment.233 There has to be some good or service
whose price can be controlled. That is, there is an assumption that
the inventor will have a product or service of some type associated
with the invention that will act as a vehicle to recoup costs. 
The external invention is more likely than the claim-centered
invention to define exclusivity around some actual good or service
of the inventor and, accordingly, to link protection with these ac-
tivities. An external invention is defined by real-space inventive
activities, tangible things, or descriptions of those activities or
things.234 The external invention defines an invention that is either
being sold or close to being sold. At the very least, it is closer to com-
ing to market than an invention defined primarily by the claims.235 
On the other hand, the claim-centered invention does not need to
have anything behind it in real space. A claim-centered invention
disturbs the assumption that exclusivity is a viable vehicle by which
costs can be recouped. Admittedly, the claim-centered inventor may
recover costs via licensing, giving her a return on her investment.236
But this would require someone with no initial knowledge of the
invention to still be willing to invest in creating an external in-
vention that falls within the scope of the claim-centered one.237 This
extra distance between protection and the product or service makes
the claim-centered invention less of a fit with the incentive-to-invent
theory.
Although it does not fall perfectly within the incentive-to-invent
story, the external definition does a better job than the claim-
centered invention of furthering the incentive-to-invent theory.
Using the external definition of invention is more likely to give the
exclusivity needed to incentivize the inventor to create while not
233. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
234. See supra Part I.C.1.
235. This is particularly true for patent applications, or more likely continuations, filed
later in the development process. See Cotropia, supra note 220, at 101-03.
236. This is one way to monetize the patent, made popular recently by so-called “patent
trolls.” See Thomas S. Kim & Michael D. Stein, Patent Value: Increased Interest Extends
Beyond “Trolls,” LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 23, 2005, at IP3; see also Cotropia, supra note
231, at 1138 (describing this engagement in licensing as an exercise of the patent “option”).
237. Or he may simply assert the patent against others and not proceed down the
commercial development path—a more likely scenario. See Cotropia, supra note 231, at 1138
(describing why this scenario is more likely if commercialization is not likely to occur in the
near future).
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overcompensating the inventor and hampering follow-on invention.
The claim-centered definition’s lack of grounding in both the real-
space aspects and the inventor’s specific implementation of the
invention makes it less likely to do the same. Put simply, the ex-
ternal invention defines invention in a manner that the incentive-to-
invent theory assumes patent law will do.
B. Prospect Theory
1. The Story
Another theory of patent law describes exclusivity as the driving
force behind innovation—or commercialization—and the eventual
diffusion of the patented technology.238 Patent law’s main goal,
under this theory, is to facilitate the commercialization of the in-
vention, not just to encourage the underlying invention’s creation.239
Exclusivity both gives the inventor “breathing room” to further
develop and refine her invention and facilitates beneficial coordina-
tion with others, aiding in the invention’s commercialization and
improvement.240 This theory is commonly referred to as the “pros-
pect theory” and was developed by Professor Edmund Kitch.241
Patent protection is viewed as providing ex post incentives to
prompt efficient maturity of the patented invention.242 
The story is as follows: Once the invention is created, the inventor
needs exclusive control over her invention—her prospect—so that
she can better manage the development of the invention.243 The
238. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1648 (2011); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 710 (2001); Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 357 (2010) (identifying the prospect theory
as a “dominant justificatory theor[y] of patent law”). 
239. Kieff, supra note 238, at 710; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977).
240. See Kitch, supra note 239, at 277-78.
241. See id. at 285-86; see also John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 444 (2004). 
242. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 195, at 1601 (noting that the prospect theory views the
goal of the patent system not as providing an incentive to invent, but as “encourag[ing]
further commercialization and the efficient use of as yet unrealized ideas”); Kitch, supra note
239, at 285-86; Lemley, supra note 17, at 132-33.
243. Kitch, supra note 239, at 276.
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patent’s exclusivity forces everyone who wants to increase the
invention’s value to make arrangements with the patent owner.244
This both allows for efficient coordinated development and discour-
ages wasteful duplication of efforts.245 
The inventor is also “incentiv[ized] ... to maximize the value of the
patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will produce
unpatentable information appropriable by competitors.”246 Exclusiv-
ity allows the patent holder “to make the expenditures necessary to
bring the advantages of the product to the attention of the customer
without fear of competitive appropriation if the product proves
successful.”247 The patentee can freely disclose information to others
to obtain venture capital, contract for supplies, and openly advertise
in the market.248 Basically, the patent facilitates the inventor’s
development, marketing, and improvement of her invention without
any unauthorized interference from others.249 
2. Which Invention Definition Best Fits This Story?
Again, the definition of invention plays a crucial role in deter-
mining what, exactly, patent law will test for validity and provide
exclusivity over. The question becomes which of these definitions
allows the patent to work like the prospect theory assumes it will—
that is, which definition makes the patent’s exclusivity fit best with
the underlying story.
At first blush, the claim-centered invention appears to be the best
fit with the prospect theory. The prospect story does not start until
after the patent issues and exclusivity takes hold.250 This part of
the patent process falls more in the realm of the claim-centered
244. See id. at 277-78.
245. See Duffy, supra note 241, at 444 (highlighting “the prospect features of the patent
system—particularly the preference for the grant of patent rights early, before most of the
resources have been committed to developing the technology and before much wasteful
duplication can occur”); Kitch, supra note 239, at 276-77.
246. Kitch, supra note 239, at 276-77.
247. Id. at 277.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 276-77; see also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871 (1990).
250. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 238, at 1649 (identifying the prospect theory as
an “ex post rationale,” but also describing the ex ante impact of the prospect nature of
patents).
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definition, in which the claim creates the invention,251 as opposed to
the external definition, which looks for prefiling activities that are
then memorialized in the patent’s specification.252 The prospect
theory also hinges most of its ex post benefits on the existence of
unified control over a given technological possibility.253 The essence
of the claim-centered invention is the creation of an area of exclusiv-
ity, with the patent claim both creating the invention and solely
defining the metes and bounds of exclusivity. The claim-centered
definition seems to be playing the role the prospect theory assumes
for the patent—a vehicle that simply sets forth the “legal limits of
the claim.”254 
In fact, the prospect theory views the scope of patent protection
“and the physical embodiment of the invention [as] two quite
different things.”255 “A [patent] claim is an abstraction and general-
ization of an indefinitely large number of concrete, physical objects”
in the theory’s view.256 Such a statement articulates a claim-
centered view of invention. And this view, in turn, can allow patent
protection to “reach[ ] well beyond” the protection required by the
incentive-to-invent theory—in other words, to amount to the
broader level of protection assumed under the prospect theory.257
Thus, the claim-centered invention would seem to be specially made
for the prospect theory. In turn, the prospect theory appears to
explicitly reject an external view of invention.
However, a closer look at various aspects of the prospect theory
uncovers the need to center protection around the external in-
vention. The need for such a link initially finds its foundations in
Kitch’s analogy between patent claims and mineral claims, which
sits at the core of the prospect theory.258 Mineral claims give the
claim holder protection well beyond the actual minerals she has
251. See supra Part I.C.2.
252. See supra Part I.C.1.
253. See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1473, 1503 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2008) (arguing
that Kitch viewed this unification as occurring via licensing).
254. Kitch, supra note 239, at 287.
255. Id. at 268.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 267.
258. See id.
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found.259 However, mineral claim protection does not start until
there is a showing of “surface mineralization.”260 The claimant must
find some minerals, though not a commercially significant amount,
before protection is granted.261 In addition, the area of protection
granted is determined “in relation to the location of the mineraliza-
tion” initially found.262 That is, the scope of exclusivity, although
exceeding the specific area of the initial mineral finding, is still
restricted by, and tied to, the initial finding.263 
If patent claims are truly like mineral claims, as the prospect
theory postulates, then patent protection needs to be tied to the
external actions of the patentee. Considered graphically, the solid
dots in Figures 1 and 2, which are the claims defining protection,
need to be related in some way to the teachings of the specifica-
tion—the large circles. Like mineral claims, patent prospects should
not be born out of whole cloth. There is an initial activity by the
inventor around which patent protection is granted. The external
invention, by requiring support from the specification’s description,
ties exclusivity to the inventor’s recognized inventive activities.
The external invention is also the definition of invention that is
concerned with the prefiling activities of the inventor.264 These
activities are analogous to the surface mineralization that forms the
foundation of the mineral claim. The claim-centered invention, in
contrast, fails to link patent protection with any external activities
of the inventor.265 In a sense, patent protection in a claim-centered
invention regime does not care whether the inventor found any
“minerals.” Protection is given in the abstract, without any refer-
ence to the inventor’s real-space activities.266 This concept of in-
vention does not fit as well with the mineral claim analogy as does
the external invention.267 In the external invention regime, the
prospects are grounded in the inventor’s real-space activities—
259. See id. at 271.
260. Id. at 271-73.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 273.
263. See id.
264. See supra Part I.C.1.
265. See supra Part I.C.2.
266. See supra Part I.C.2 (describing the claim-centered definition).
267. See supra Part I.C.1 (describing the external invention).
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depicted as a large circle in Figure 1 representing the specification’s
description.
The external invention is also a better fit than the claim-centered
invention with the prospect theory’s assumption that the patent
holder is a superior manager and coordinator of the claimed
technological prospect.268 The more an individual knows about the
actual implementation of the invention, the better decisions that
individual can make about the technology’s development.269 In
addition, such an individual will spend less time and fewer re-
sources to get up to speed on the best way to commercialize a given
invention.270 Either by engaging in such external inventive activity
herself or by learning to do so from the inventor who did, the patent
holder can more efficiently exploit the prospect.271 An external
invention ensures that the protection granted by the patent is tied
to some of this real-space knowledge. The two areas co-exist. The
claim-centered invention, in contrast, ensures only that the lang-
uage generally describing the prospect, but nothing more, exists.272 
Kitch even assumed some of this real-space knowledge about the
invention would exist at the time of patenting.273 Kitch viewed the
patent application as a poor mechanism for disseminating informa-
tion about the invention,274 and argued that the patent disclosure is
an inefficient and “balky mechanism” for communicating what the
invention is all about.275 Instead, the inventor will communicate this
information directly to those interested in assisting in the inven-
tion’s exploitation.276 Although these comments indict both defini-
268. See Kitch, supra note 239, at 276.
269. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 137 (“[M]any patent owners are ‘paper patentees’ who
never even built their invention; giving them control over distribution hardly seems a recipe
for success.”).
270. The inventor is much farther down the commercialization process of an invention that
is defined by the specification’s description. See Cotropia, supra note 220, at 92-93 (describing
the development process and noting that the more information about a given product one has,
the closer she is to commercialization).
271. Id. at 107-09 (explaining that the more information one has about the actual
implementation of the invention, the closer one is to commercialization).
272. See supra Part I.C.2 (defining the claim-centered invention).
273. See Kitch, supra note 239, at 276-77, 287-88 (explaining that the inventor should
describe the patent to show how far the legal limits of the claim extend).
274. Id. at 287.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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tions of invention, an external invention ensures that protection is
linked to at least some additional invention information—all
stemming from the inventive activities of the inventor.277 Again,
with a claim-centered invention, the claim language may be all the
inventor discloses about a given technological prospect.278
Thus, the external invention fits better with the prospect theory
of patent protection. The lack of a perfect fit may have implications
as to where doctrine should go from here. That is, protection may
start, or center, on the external invention, but the prospect theory,
in contrast to the incentive-to-invent theory, may call upon other
doctrines to expand protection—the doctrine of equivalents, for
example.279 These “next step” implications are discussed in more de-
tail below.
  III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHOOSING THE EXTERNAL   
INVENTION 
Even if patent theory suggests the use of a particular definition
of invention, several doctrinal implications still warrant exploration.
Moving from the abstract stories of the patent system to doctrinal
specifics reveals how focusing on an external definition of the
invention—the inventor’s description and recognition of her inven-
tive activities—impacts patent law.280 How this definitional choice
resolves the doctrinal conflicts discussed previously and impacts
some other doctrinal areas is explored below.
A. Dictates Specific Results in Current Doctrinal Conflicts
These results should not come as a surprise. Because different
definitions fueled the conflicts over claim interpretation methodol-
ogy and the written description requirement, selecting a singular
definition—the external invention—identifies a clear winner in
these disputes. For the most part, the Federal Circuit has chosen
the external invention and thus has been “correct”—at least theory-
277. See supra Part I.C.1 (explaining the external invention and the role of the inventive
activities of the inventor).
278. See supra Part I.C.2 (defining the claim-centered invention).
279. See infra Part III.B.2.
280. See supra Part I.C.1 (explaining the external invention).
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wise—in its doctrinal developments.281 However, as evidenced by
continued dissents in both conflict spaces,282 clear recognition of a
unified definition of invention would help identify a true “winner”
and provide guidance as to how these doctrinal choices should
develop further.
1. Claims Should Be “Read in Light of the Specification”
The big debate in claim interpretation is how the specification
should inform claim meaning. Methodology driven by the claim-
centered invention uses the specification sparingly, looking to it
only if the patentee decided to explicitly define the terms in the
specification.283 In contrast, methodology based on an external def-
inition of the invention relies heavily on the contextual description
of the inventive activities in the specification to inform the claims’
meaning.284 Framed another way, the claim-centered invention def-
inition falls heavily on the “do not import limitation from the
specification into the claims” side of specification usage, whereas the
external definition supports a “read the claims in light of the
specification” view.285
Consequently, choosing an external definition of the invention
means the specification plays a heavy role in interpreting the
281. See, e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (“Since its inception, this court has consistently held that § 112, first paragraph,
contains a written description requirement separate from enablement, and we have
articulated a ‘fairly uniform standard,’ which we now affirm.” (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991))); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“It is therefore entirely appropriate for a court, when
conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on the written description for guidance as to the
meaning of the claim.”).
282. See Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp., 635 F.3d
1373, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting
as to the scope of the written requirement); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part) (“‘[A] bedrock
principle of patent law’ [is] that the claims themselves, not the written description portion of
the specification, define the patented invention.” (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312)).
283. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
284. See supra Part I.C.1.a.
285. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris
Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]here is sometimes a fine line between reading
a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from the
specification.”).
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claims. Such usage is exemplified by the discussions in Phillips and
the dissent in Arlington Industries discussed above in Part I.C.1. In
these opinions, the court heavily relied on the specification to
determine what the invention was and then used this information
to dictate claim meaning.286 These are examples of decisions that
have chosen and applied the external definition of the invention.
Such a doctrinal decision does present questions as to what role,
if any, claims play. Even when adhering to an external definition of
invention, the court must use claims as the starting point of the
claim interpretation analysis.287 The claim terms establish which
aspects of the invention the patentee wishes to protect.288 The claim
terms are a lens of sorts: they establish the angle by which exclusiv-
ity is defined. This lens—the claim terms—through which the spec-
ification is viewed, defines the scope of the protected invention. Such
a role for claims brings the system back to the original purpose of
peripheral claiming—focusing patent examination, and in turn the
patent system, on the aspects of the patent disclosure for which the
patentee is seeking protection.289 The claims help examiners focus
on what exactly is to be tested for patentability—that is, which
parts of the specification need to be tested for utility, novelty, and
nonobviousness.290 If examiners are properly focused, this focus
would simply continue in further patent venues, from district court
claim interpretations to private patent valuation.
2. Disclosure Must Comply with an Independent Written  
Description Requirement
The debate regarding the written description requirement is
another example of the two definitions facing off.291 A claim-centered
definition sees little need for an independent written description
requirement given that claims can be self-describing.292 According
286. See supra Part I.C.1.a.
287. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
289. See Duffy, supra note 32, at 309-10.
290. See Lutz, supra note 32, at 134-47 (discussing the history of patent claims);
Woodward, supra note 32, at 757 (“In this country, the claims are regarded as definitions of
the invention, rather than mere guides to its scope.”).
291. See supra Part I.C.
292. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
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to the claim-centered definition, no other proof of possession of the
invention is needed, whereas an external definition of the invention
asks for a fuller description to prove that the inventor conceived of
the claimed subject matter.293 
Selecting an external invention thus solidifies the existence of an
independent written description requirement. Decisions such as
those in Ariad and Centocor provide examples of a written descrip-
tion doctrine implementing an external definition of invention.294 In
both of these cases, and most of the post-Ariad written description
cases, the Federal Circuit has implemented an external definition
of invention through an independent written description require-
ment. Although some disputes over the doctrine persist,295 most
courts continue to invalidate claims that the specification’s disclo-
sure reveals the inventor did not “visualize or recognize.”296 
B. Repositions Other Doctrines
Broader implications of selecting an external definition of inven-
tion exist, beyond the impact on the two doctrinal areas already
discussed. These are second-order effects—byproducts of recognizing
the underlying definition of invention as one that focuses beyond the
claims on external indications of invention.
Two such doctrinal repositionings are discussed below. First,
courts will need to be aware of the validity doctrine that governs the
specification—written description, enablement, and best mode297
—when construing the claims because they will be reading the
claims in light of specification. And, second, considering that courts
will likely narrowly construe claims under the external definition,
the doctrine of equivalents should play a more robust role in
constructing patent exclusivity to ensure patent policy stays intact. 
293. See supra Part I.C.1.b.
294. See supra Part I.C.1.b.
295. See, e.g., Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp., 635
F.3d 1373, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(disagreeing on scope of written description requirement).
296. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
297. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (explaining the validity doctrine that governs specification).
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1. Construing Claims to Meet the Disclosure Requirements
Another open issue in claim interpretation methodology is
whether claims should be construed so that they are valid.298 If a
court is confronted with two potential claim meanings, it should
choose the one that maintains the validity of the claim.299 Such an
approach would collapse at least part of the validity inquiry into the
interpretation process. This approach would also mean that the
patentability requirements would influence claim meaning. 
Explicit recognition of an external invention necessarily brings at
least the disclosure requirements into the claim interpretation
process. Because claims must be read in light of the specification,
the disclosure dictates claim meaning.300 The claim’s ultimate
meaning is required to be within the disclosure.301 Thus, not only a
written description of the invention but also an enabling disclosure
and best mode are used to interpret the claims.302 The explicit
linkage draws the specification and the requirements that dictate
its composition into claim interpretation.303
As a result, claims can have meaning—at least literal mean-
ing—only as broad as the disclosure describes, enables, and provides
the best mode for.304 For example, if the specification does not
explain to a skilled artisan how to practice a certain aspect of the
claim element without undue experimentation, then the claim
element cannot be given a meaning that encompasses that aspect
because it is not within the inventor’s invention for patent law
298. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“While we
have acknowledged the maxim that claims should be construed to preserve their validity, we
have not applied that principle broadly, and we have certainly not endorsed a regime in which
validity analysis is a regular component of claim construction.” (citing Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc.
v. ARM Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2005))); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (concluding that
limitations should not be added to claims to preserve the validity of the claims). 
299. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (reciting
the “familiar axiom that claims should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity”
(quoting Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
300. See supra Part I.C.1.a.
301. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring that a claim particularly point out and distinguish the
subject matter of the invention).
302. See id. (describing the three disclosure requirements).
303. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (noting that claims must be interpreted “in the
context of the entire patent, including the specification”).
304. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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purposes. The claim’s meaning cannot fall outside the specification’s
description circle, as shown in Figure 1 above, under the external
invention.305 These validity requirements must therefore be con-
sidered during claim interpretation and inform the ultimate claim
meaning. At least, the disclosure requirements aspect of validity
will play a role in claim interpretation.
2. Greater Use of the Doctrine of Equivalents
One of the results from using an external definition of the
invention is that the literal claim scope is likely to be narrow.306 As
the claims become more informed by the specification and the
inventive activities described therein, the claim meaning will likely
gravitate to the embodiments described. Narrow, and perhaps more,
limitations will make their way into claim term meaning as the
claims become tailored to the rest of the patent disclosure. This
result makes sense given the approach of the external invention
inquiry: defining the invention, and therefore the claim terms, to
mimic the real-space understanding and activities of the inventor. 
Although this produces a better fit with the patent stories than
does the claim-centered definition, the resulting exclusivity may not
fully carry out the patent’s purpose.307 A greater scope of protection
may be needed to ensure the inventor can control price enough to
capture her costs.308 Or, more likely, she may need more protection
to gain the breathing room needed to commercialize the invention.309
Narrow exclusivity tied to embodiments described in the patent can
leave too much room for others to grab or dilute the value of the
305. See supra Figure 1.
306. See supra Part I.C.1.a (referring back to Figure 1 and showing how the external
invention limits the scope of the claim’s meaning).
307. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patents, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 74-75 (2004).
308. Id. at 75 (“To the extent that patents play an important role in innovation, narrowing
the doctrine of equivalents is likely to reduce the incentives for, and hence the resources
invested in, innovation.”).
309. See A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-Quite-Holy
Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 288 (1996) (“For revolutionary inventions, the reward,
patent-induced, and prospect theories would all predict a broad scope of protection, so that
literal and nonliteral infringement (under the doctrine of equivalents and contributory and
induced infringement) would be broadly interpreted.”).
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invention via minor design changes.310 Protection over, at most, the
full external invention may not be enough to incentivize people to
invent or further develop the prospect.311
Patent law, however, has developed a doctrine to address these
problems—the doctrine of equivalents (DOE).312 At its core, DOE is
meant to prevent such skirting of patent protection.313 DOE started
as an equitable doctrine314 but has since “shifted away from a
fairness rationale for the doctrine toward an intent-neutral ration-
ale based on economic efficiency.”315 Courts now view DOE as
making up “for the shortcomings, or, put another way, the inefficien-
cies, of the patent claim in properly capturing the patentee’s inven-
tion.”316 DOE is a patent policy lever.317
But DOE has gone into hibernation,318 and many have postulated
why. The Federal Circuit has whittled away at DOE with various
defenses and exceptions to its usage—prosecution history estoppel,
the all-elements rule, and public dedication, to name a few.319 Some
scholars contend that the literal claim interpretation process swal-
310. See Chiang, supra note 4, at 1139 (“Moreover, not only is protection beyond literal
reproduction of the patentee’s creation necessary for the patent incentive to work, it can also
be socially beneficial.”).
311. See id. at 42 (“With very few exceptions, protection against only literal reproduction
is worthless and easily circumvented.” (footnote omitted)).
312. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997); Graver Tank
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (“‘To temper unsparing logic and
prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of an invention’ a patentee may invoke this
doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device ‘if it performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.’” (citations omitted) (quoting
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929); Royal Typewriter Co. v.
Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948))).
313. See Cotropia, supra note 18, at 115-24.
314. Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope:
A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1956-57 (2005).
315. Id. at 1957-58; see also Cotropia, supra note 208, at 160.
316. Cotropia, supra note 208, at 161.
317. Burk & Lemley, supra note 195, at 1641; Cotropia, supra note 208, at 187 (describing
how DOE can be used as a policy lever).
318. Allison & Lemley, supra note 23, at 966 (“By far the most dramatic finding of our
study is that patentees rarely win doctrine of equivalents cases. Overall, patentees won only
24% of the doctrine of equivalents cases decided in the last eight years.”).
319. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-37 (2002)
(prosecution history estoppel); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co, 520 U.S. 17,
29 (1997) (all-elements rule); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d
1046, 1053-55 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (public dedication).
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lowed up the additional zone of protection DOE once provided.320
The whole scope of exclusivity discussion now occurs under the
guise of the interpretation of the claims.321 The fuzzier discussions
of substantial similarities or insubstantial differences have been
replaced by the sterile process of claim interpretation.322
An explicit move to the external definition of invention would
likely reverse this trend. The resulting narrow, literal claim mean-
ing will leave room to utilize DOE when patent policy dictates.323
Particularly if the prospect theory of patents is the policy focus,
patentees and courts will have to rely on DOE to get that extra
protection some may need.324 Policy, as opposed to questions of claim
term meaning, would play a larger role when determining patent
infringement.325
A greater role for DOE could inject more ambiguity into determin-
ing patent exclusivity.326 As opposed to focusing on claim meaning,
320. See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 23, at 977 (“We suspect that the real driving
force behind the dramatic decline of the doctrine of equivalents is not a doctrine of equivalents
case at all, but the Supreme Court’s Markman claim construction decision.”). 
321. Id. (“As a result, judges increasingly sought to resolve the doctrine of equivalents as
well as literal infringement on summary judgment.”); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743,
1763 (2009) (“Courts are aware that the text of the claims is supposed to represent the
outermost boundaries of the inventor’s rights, and they are anxious not to expand the claims
through the doctrine of equivalents.”).
322. Substantial similarities and insubstantial differences are two of the tests for DOE.
See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (defining
the test for DOE as whether the device “performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result” (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v.
Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929))); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d
1512, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (applying the insubstantial difference test by looking at
how different the device was from the patented claim), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17
(1997). For a more in-depth look at the various tests and limitations of DOE, see Allison &
Lemley, supra note 23, at 959-60.
323. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 195, at 1598 n.69 (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents
provides a means for broadening the scope of a patent beyond the literal language of the
claims.”).
324. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 321, at 1796 (“Courts should think expressly about the
importance of an invention in defining its scope ... through the doctrine of equivalents.”).
325. See, e.g., id. at 1796-97 (envisioning renewed usage of DOE to assist in “accurately
captur[ing] what the patentee invented,” particularly in the case of pioneering patents).
326. See Petherbridge, supra note 23, at 1374 (“But the systemic protection provided by the
doctrine of equivalents comes at a cost. By allowing a patentee to exclude others from subject
matter beyond the textual scope of a patent’s claims, the doctrine fosters uncertainty in
competition.”).
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patent players would need to determine whether a device, for
example, is insubstantially different from the claimed invention.327
However, not much certainty exists in a claim-centered approach—
with the ambiguity shifting from questions of insubstantial dif-
ferences to the meaning of claim terms that have multiple dictio-
nary definitions.328 Many studies on the certainty, or lack thereof,
of claim interpretation support this conclusion.329
Moreover, there is also a transparency benefit to greater utiliza-
tion of DOE. Major policy determinations as to the breadth of
protection a patentee enjoys beyond her external invention are
made in that very context, with courts explicitly asking whether the
additional protection is needed for the patent system to operate
properly.330 The case-by-case nature of DOE, although providing
perhaps less ex ante certainty, at least contextualizes the inquiry by
comparing what the alleged infringer has done to the inventor’s
activities.331 This is unlike the claim interpretation process, in which
courts are instructed not to consider the infringer’s actions when
interpreting claim terms.332 The resulting exclusivity, with protec-
tion over the external invention supplemented with DOE, could be
better tailored to the situation at hand and the underlying patent
theory.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated above, patent doctrine disputes can be distilled
to a single question—what is the invention? By answering this
question in light of first principles—basic patent theory—resolution
of these disputes becomes easier. Understanding what is at the core
of these conflicts and how they interrelate is very powerful, both in
327. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 23, at 959 (explaining the different tests for DOE).
328. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(“[B]ecause words often have multiple dictionary meanings, the intrinsic record must be
consulted to determine which of the different possible dictionary meanings is most consistent
with the use of the term in question by the inventor.”).
329. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, at 249-50 (reporting on the high reversal rate of
claim interpretations by district courts).
330. See Cotropia, supra note 208, at 152, 159-62.
331. See id. at 187.
332. NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 287 F.3d 1062, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“[C]laims may not be construed with reference to the accused device.”).
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the clarity it provides for the particular doctrinal area and in the
ability to link the conflict to broader patent policy. The hope is that,
although this Article looks almost exclusively at two doctrinal areas,
other judges, policymakers, and scholars will use the invention
definitions, and their interactions with patent theory, to settle other
areas of doctrinal ambiguity or disagreement. 
